Examining techniques for measuring the effects of nutrients on mental performance and mood state by Mark Hamer (1254141) et al.
1 3
Eur J Nutr (2016) 55:1991–2000
DOI 10.1007/s00394-015-1143-3
REVIEW
Examining techniques for measuring the effects of nutrients 
on mental performance and mood state
Mark Hamer1 · Louise Dye2 · E. Siobhan Mitchell3 · Sophie Layé4,5 · 
Caroline Saunders6,7 · Neil Boyle2 · Jeroen Schuermans8 · John Sijben9 
Received: 11 March 2015 / Accepted: 16 December 2015 / Published online: 7 January 2016 
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Methods A multi-stakeholder expert group was invited 
by ILSI Europe to come to a consensus around the util-
ity of objective and subjective measurement in this field, 
which forms the basis of the paper. Therefore, the present 
review reflects a succinct overview of the science but is not 
intended to be a systematic review.
Results The proposed approach extends the traditional 
methodology using standard ‘objective’ measurements to 
also include the consumers’ subjective experiences in rela-
tion to food. Specific recommendations include 1) using 
contemporary methods to capture transient mood states; 2) 
using sufficiently sensitive measures to capture effects of 
nutritional intervention; 3) considering the possibility that 
subjective and objective responses will occur over different 
Abstract 
Purpose Intake of specific nutrients has been linked to 
mental states and various indices of cognitive performance 
although the effects are often subtle and difficult to inter-
pret. Measurement of so-called objective variables (e.g. 
reaction times) is often considered to be the gold stand-
ard for assessing outcomes in this field of research. It can, 
however, be argued that data on subjective experience (e.g. 
mood) are also important and may enrich existing objec-
tive data. The aim of this review is to evaluate methods for 
measuring mental performance and mood, considering the 
definition of subjective mood and the validity of measures 
of subjective experience.
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time frames; and 4) recognition of the importance of expec-
tancy and placebo effects for subjective measures.
Conclusions The consensus reached was that the most 
informative approach should involve collection and consid-
eration of both objective and subjective data.
Keywords Mood · Cognition · Objective · Subjective · 
Food · Mental health · Affective assessment
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RVIP  Rapid visual information processing
TSST  Trier social stress test
Introduction
Nutrition plays an important role in brain function 
throughout the entire lifespan. Appropriate nutrient intake 
allows normal brain growth and neurodevelopment in 
early life and reduces the risk of cognitive decline and Alz-
heimer’s disease in older age [1, 2]. Our knowledge about 
nutrition has greatly evolved over the last 50 years, and 
in developed countries, food is no longer seen uniquely 
as a survival necessity and a primary need, but is associ-
ated with promotion of mental fitness [3–5]. The effects 
of nutrients on cognitive performance—mental processes 
(e.g. attention, memory, reasoning, problem solving, deci-
sion-making) related to the processing of information and 
application of knowledge—have been widely examined 
usually by employing objective outcomes measures such 
as reaction time and accuracy. The effects of nutrition on 
subjective measures of psychological functions, such as 
self-reported mood, have received relatively less atten-
tion. The aim of this review is to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the theoretical frameworks that link subjec-
tive experience of mood to cognition and, from this under-
standing, identify the most promising methods to measure 
the individual experience of mood and its relationship to 
cognitive function. This will be illustrated with examples 
from studies that have examined the effects of nutritional 
interventions on cognitive performance and mood. How-
ever, the effects of nutritional manipulations are often 
subtle and inconsistently reported (e.g. Halyburton et al. 
[6]; Hellhammer et al. [7]; Rogers et al. [8]). Therefore, 
this review will also draw upon examples from the stress, 
cognition and mood literature, since stress induction [e.g. 
the use of sensory overload (excessive noise) or perform-
ing a task under social evaluation to provoke a psycho-
physiological stress response] is both robust and reliable 
in the provocation of mood change and moderation of 
cognitive function [9, 10]. Whilst stress response can be 
termed as any alteration to homoeostasis in an organism, 
for the purposes of this review, stress is defined as a mis-
match between the demands of a task/context/stimuli and 
perceived ability to cope. If a context/stimuli is perceived 
as stressful, this will provoke a subjective response (e.g. 
negative affect/mood) and a physiological response (e.g. 
the release of the hormone cortisol to orchestrate the neu-
roendocrine response to stress). The main topics that will 
be addressed are: (1) how to best measure mental perfor-
mance and mood, i.e. which measures are most reliable 
and validated under which conditions, (2) how placebo 
effects may affect subjective state and response to nutri-
ent intervention, (3) the relationship between objective and 
subjective measures, (4) the ability to detect meaningful 
effects and elucidate their mechanism of action and (5) 
how nutrient effects on subjective experience, measured 
by standardised questionnaires, translate into everyday life 
and the clinical relevance of these. The proposed approach 
extends the traditional empirical approach of using solely 
standard “objective” measurements to also consider sub-
jective state in a more integrated manner using advances in 
technology and appropriate analytical strategies. Such data 
on subjective experience may enrich our understanding 
and interpretation of objective measures and as such these 
recommendations are expected to help guide researchers 
from academia and industry when studying the effects that 
foods or specific product consumption can have on mood 
and mental performance.
Definition and measurement of subjective mood 
state
In behavioural sciences, measures of motor and cognitive 
behaviour (reaction time, number of words recalled) and 
physiological variables (salivary cortisol concentration, 
blood pressure, heart rate variability) are considered to be 
objective measures, in contrast to self-rating/self-reported 
measures of cognitive performance (e.g. participants’ self-
rated perception of how accurately or quickly a task was 
performed) and mood, which are often referred to as sub-
jective measures of an individual’s subjective experience. 
Mood can be described as a pervasive and predominant 
affective state and is commonly conceived to vary along 
orthogonal and bipolar dimensions of valence (positive 
vs negative) and arousal/activation (e.g. Russell [11]; 
Watson and Tellegen [12]). Mood can also be temporally 
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separated into protracted (e.g. depressed mood) and tran-
sient, fluctuating affective states (e.g. a momentary state 
of increased vigour). As mood is inherently phenomeno-
logical, it is perceived as an inconsistent measure of the 
brain’s output, despite demonstrations that mood can be 
consistently measured. For example, specific drugs (e.g. 
Brown and Chandler [13]; Mula and Sander [14]) and 
stimuli (e.g. stress [15]) have been shown to have very 
consistent effects on mood, as measured by ratings on 
scales and questionnaires. In addition to well-being ques-
tionnaires, which often capture protracted, generalised 
affective mood states, there are several validated tools 
available to assess transient mood states which have been 
able to capture changes in mood as a result of a number 
of different nutritional interventions [16, 17]. For example, 
relative to placebo, a 30-day high-flavanol chocolate drink 
improved self-rated calmness and contentedness, meas-
ured by Bond–Lader mood scales [16] and the Profile of 
Mood States (POMS) captured changes in tension–anxiety 
scores following intervention with L-theanine under con-
ditions of induced stress [17]. Table 1 provides examples 
of questionnaire/scale measures of subjective mood state 
and well-being and their potential suitability for nutritional 
interventions.
Moods can be linked to specific events, such as those 
caused by artificial mood inductions, but more commonly 
they occur somewhat independently of second-by-second, 
or minute-by-minute circumstances. Ecological momen-
tary assessment (EMA) or experience sampling methods 
(ESM) are alternative mood measurement tools which 
may more realistically capture sequential, transient states 
by requiring brief inputs of mood state during daily activi-
ties. EMA data can be captured, for example, via mobile 
devices such as smart phones, where participants are 
periodically asked to fill in short questionnaires. Psycho-
logical research has established that recollected effect may 
diverge from actual experience because it is influenced by 
errors in recollection, recall biases, focusing illusions and 
salient memory heuristics [18]. This “memory–experience 
gap” between life as it is remembered and life as it is expe-
rienced may be important to the processes through which 
the past impacts on future behaviour. Moreover, effects 
resulting from interventions with nutrients may not be 
noticeable after acute administrations commonly applied 
in laboratory settings, but may give rise to improved well-
being over time, especially if the intervention has other 
benefits such as cardiovascular health. One recent study, 
which endeavoured to measure daily fluctuations in mood 
via cell phone questionnaires, reported an effect of a multi-
vitamin supplement on alertness after 4-week supplemen-
tation [19]. Others have validated cardiovascular biomark-
ers against the mood reports acquired during daily life. For 
instance, Steptoe and colleagues found that systolic blood 
pressure correlated with positive effect in men during 
work hours [20].
Validity of measures of subjective states
There are numerous types of validity, but in this context, 
the most important is construct validity—are we actually 
measuring what we think we are measuring? Evaluation 
of construct validity involves demonstrating that the meas-
ure correlates with variables that are known to be related 
to the construct (purportedly measured by the instrument 
being evaluated or for which there are theoretical grounds 
for expecting it to be related). Thus, identifying the “gold 
standard” against which to validate is crucial. Employing 
the stress induction model to illustrate this point, the semi-
nal work of Seyle [21] explained that many stressors placed 
upon us have neutral effects until, by our own thinking, we 
appraise the experience as subjectively negative or positive. 
Thus, when measuring stress in individuals, it is important 
to acknowledge that a self-report of stress will need to be 
evaluated against the baseline of an individual (i.e. person-
ality, past experience, as well as physiological state). This 
explains why different people may have profoundly different 
reactions to the same basic source of stress. In other words, it 
is one’s own perception that is crucial. However, both physi-
ological and subjective mood responses to stress are rela-
tively stable individual traits and can thus be accurately and 
consistently measured after exposure to stressful stimuli. For 
example, good correlations between subjective and physi-
ological stress increases are shown in participants after the 
Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) [15]. Yet measurement of 
stress elicited by the TSST can be modulated by genetics, 
lifestyle, etc., and thus, validity of any subjective measure-
ment will need to be evaluated in the context of these types 
of variables.
Contextual information is often missed when compar-
ing measures; thus, validation of self-report with perfor-
mance or physiological data must take into account large 
individual differences and also must control for as many 
external variables as possible. For example, measuring 
physical activity with objective (accelerometry) compared 
with self-report measures, not surprisingly produces very 
poor correlations [22] and is interpreted as reflecting recall 
bias inherent in self-report measures. However, an alterna-
tive explanation is that the two methods measure different 
things. Self-reports take into account the specific context, 
whereas accelerometry is a raw measure of movement. In 
summary, validity of subjective measures can be obtained 
via consistency of results after highly controlled stimuli 
such as the TSST and to some extent with physiologi-
cal measures, when carefully controlled for “individual” 
factors.
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Detection and interpretation of meaningful effects
A common problem in this field is how to interpret null 
effects. Detecting no effect on a measure of subjective state 
following a nutritional intervention could mean that the 
intervention really does not influence the mood parameter 
measured. Alternatively, it could reflect a lack of sensitiv-
ity of that measure to small or subtle changes in state or 
that the intervention prevented a degradation that would 
otherwise have been observed. An effect may also fail to be 
detected because of inadequate power which is also related 
to the magnitude of the experimental effect, or individual 
differences in the use of a scale which increase variability 
and decrease sensitivity of the measure [5]. Large inter- 
and intra-subject variability in subjective measures such 
as mood mean that larger sample sizes to detect the effects 
of a nutrient against this relatively noisy background may 
be required. Null or inconsistent effects may also be attrib-
utable to the use of insensitive experimental designs (e.g. 
between subjects) or inappropriate selection of baseline 
measures and the failure to include these in the statistical 
analysis. Two psychological measures of mood may claim 
to measure the same subjective state, but it may be that 
only one is sufficiently sensitive to detect effects of a nutri-
tional manipulation. It is feasible that commonly employed 
measures may be inadequate to assess subjective state in 
relation to nutrient intervention and mask real effects. A 
lack of effect on some measures could be due to a subtle 
effect of a nutrient on only one component of the subjec-
tive state which when computed into a “scale score” is no 
longer detected. Many studies have simply administered 
“off the shelf” measures and report the factor scores or 
summed items based on previous validation studies or fac-
tor analyses which are not based on the same populations 
in the same state, e.g. following a nutrition intervention.
Appropriate analyses of data from studies where sub-
jective state is the outcome variable pose some unique 
problems. Even where participants can be randomised to 
nutrient or placebo interventions, it cannot be assumed 
that baseline measures will not differ and hence change 
from baseline or inclusion of baseline as a covariate is the 
recommended statistical approach. In these randomised 
studies, both analysis of variance (ANOVA) on change 
from baseline and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with 
baseline as a covariate will be unbiased [23]. In non-ran-
domised studies where baseline differences may pre-exist 
and samples may be more heterogeneous, both methods 
may contradict each other since neither can be unbiased. 
True randomisation is therefore the preferred approach. 
Moreover, the overuse and over-interpretation of subgroup 
analyses poses further problems in this field [24], as does 
the splitting of samples using median splits [21] since these 
may exaggerate or even produce effects which are actually 
artefacts of the reduction of a continuous variable such as 
mood to a categorical group.
Expectancy and placebo effects
Placebo effects are a concern for all scientific research and 
well-designed clinical studies go to great lengths to avoid 
potential bias introduced by these effects by “blinding”. 
However, via expectations, placebos influence a variety 
of outcome measures including physiological responses. 
Despite continuing efforts to fully understand the psycho-
logical mechanisms of placebo effects, it is well recognised 
that expectation is a major contributor to study outcomes in 
response to treatment in intervention studies [25]. Expec-
tancy effects can be described as changes in behaviour that 
occur in an experiment due to the anticipation of results 
that unconsciously affect the outcome. The observation 
that these effects may be one of the main mechanisms that 
underlie the placebo effect has been supported by neuroim-
aging studies which have shown that the placebo response 
is associated with widespread frontal and prefrontal activa-
tion which is consistent with the processing of expectation 
and executive function [26]. Most of our knowledge about 
placebo mechanisms comes from investigations of pla-
cebo effects in the domain of pain [27] where patients have 
repeatedly experienced significant pain relief from place-
bos when the placebo is described as an analgesic medica-
tion compared to when it is not [28]. This is an example 
of a verbal cue that can create a strong expectancy effect 
which results in behavioural, clinical or physiological 
changes [29]. Another example of this is where caffeine-
associated stimuli such as the smell and taste of coffee have 
been shown to elicit both self-reported and physiological 
arousal [30] and where the expectation of having consumed 
caffeine can result in improvements in cognitive perfor-
mance and mood [18]. In this particular study, participants 
were randomly allocated to both a drink (caffeinated coffee 
vs. decaffeinated coffee) and an expectancy (told caffeine 
vs. told decaffeinated) condition. Both caffeine and expec-
tation of having consumed caffeine improved attention and 
psychomotor speed.
There are many other factors which influence expec-
tation including previous experience of the intervention, 
knowledge of others’ accounts, influences such as the 
researcher and non-verbal and sensory cues such as the 
label of the product and the taste. For instance, Rogers 
et al. [31] showed that when energy drinks were labelled 
“energy drink” rather than “healthy and nutritious”, both 
the expected energy from the drink and the expectation of 
better performance on cognitive tasks were significantly 
1996 Eur J Nutr (2016) 55:1991–2000
1 3
greater. In this study, taste also resulted in expectation of 
better performance on the task; however, these expectan-
cies did not carry through to influence actual performance, 
which is contradictory to Green et al.’s study [32]. They 
did find that expectancy effects were able to influence per-
formance on a cognitive task. Green et al. [32] gave study 
participants either glucose or aspartame on two occasions in 
a counterbalanced manner. On one occasion, for each treat-
ment, participants were misinformed about the treatment 
they were going to receive (glucose or aspartame). Improve-
ments in the Bakan vigilance task were observed after glu-
cose consumption, but only when participants were told 
they were going to receive glucose. No task improvements 
were observed when participants thought that they were 
consuming aspartame. Similar effects were observed by 
Stollery and Christian [33] who found a subtle improvement 
in a task of delayed free recall when participants believed 
they had consumed glucose. Whilst the authors concluded 
that the expectancy effects were small and unlikely to be 
confused with glucose enhancements, they did suggest that 
routine collection of product beliefs should be carried out 
in future studies. This is particularly important when test-
ing commercial products, on potential consumers. Whilst 
typically substantial effort is invested to control for placebo 
effects (by having a placebo), expectancy effects are also 
important for subjective and objective state post-ingestion. 
Moreover, it is these effects reinforced by repeated exposure 
which will guide consumers into making a decision to pur-
chase a product. Hence, expectancy effects also need to be 
measured in studies of nutrient interventions. These obser-
vations also emphasise the importance of an appropriate, 
well-matched placebo, particularly in experiments where 
the product could easily be recognised by the consumer, and 
post-study debriefing may be useful to assess the effective-
ness of blinding of the treatment conditions (although this is 
rarely reported in published studies). It should also be noted 
that use of objective measures will not cancel or even ame-
liorate placebo effects. Thus, the expectancy of the study 
participants is an important factor in the design of nutri-
tional intervention studies.
Relationships between subjective and objective 
mental performance measures
Whilst mood states are subjective in the sense that they 
occur in a person’s experience, manifestations of mood 
can also be observed objectively in physical actions, cog-
nition and behaviour. Mood-influenced cognition is most 
often studied in patients with depression or those who 
have recovered from depression. In such studies, depres-
sion has been shown to correlate with worse performance 
in attention and memory tasks. The definition of clinical 
depression is defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM V) as a 
“depressed mood or a loss of interest or pleasure in daily 
activities for more than 2 weeks, where mood represents 
a change from the person’s baseline”. This rather qualita-
tive definition is made quantitative in clinical intervention 
studies by establishment of threshold scores in depression 
checklists or questionnaires (such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory) which measure particular levels of impaired 
function in social, occupational and educational settings. 
Due to the concrete criteria of clinical depression, com-
parison of depressed vs healthy participant behaviour is a 
useful approach for understanding mood–cognition inter-
actions. For instance, depressed study participants dem-
onstrate attentional negative bias towards stimuli such as 
words or facial expressions as compared to non-depressed 
participants [34] and show a slowing down of response 
times compared to non-depressed participants. Interest-
ingly, researchers have shown that participants with familial 
history of depression, but with no prior diagnosis of depres-
sion, also exhibit attentional bias towards negative stimuli 
that is greater than that of participants with no familial his-
tory of depression. These “emotional bias” cognition tests 
have been proposed as an early detection method to iden-
tify participants with a predisposition to depression. Simi-
larly, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) meas-
urements of amygdala reactivity to negative stimuli appear 
to be greater in participants with family history of depres-
sion or carriers of putative “depression genes” such as the 
5-HTTLPR short alleles or met MAO alleles [35].
With respect to healthy participants, the negative effect 
of poor mood on cognition has been demonstrated with 
similar paradigms. For example, after a stress induction to 
provoke negative mood, participants exhibit stronger reac-
tions to negative stimuli reflected by altered reaction times 
or decision-making [36]. Poor mood has also been shown 
to affect attentional biases towards punishment-associated 
stimuli, as manifested by faster reaction time towards such 
stimuli. Impaired cognitive processing due to mood has 
also been observed via poorer performance on effortful ver-
sus automatic visual tasks in depressed subjects [37]. The 
above examples describe several areas where mood has an 
immediate effect on cognition; however, we also need to 
consider the direct effects of nutrients on mood and cogni-
tion and how they may not be measurable at the same time. 
Consideration needs to be given to the fact that there may 
be a temporal lag between ingestion of a nutrient and its 
effect on mood and cognition. For example, improvements 
in mood may have a motivating effect on subsequent cogni-
tive performance. It is highly likely that effects of nutrients 
or dietary supplements on mood and cognition occur within 
different time frames and even at different doses of the 
nutrient and as such effects may be missed if subjective and 
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objective measures are not considered concomitantly and 
independently. For example in an acute study by Scholey 
et al. [19], cognitive performance and self-reported mental 
fatigue were measured after two doses of cocoa flavanols. 
Both doses improved performance on the Serial Threes task, 
whilst only the low dose improved mood. In addition, the 
high acute dose improved response times in a Rapid Visual 
Information Processing Task (RVIP) but showed no effects 
on mood. It is plausible that the effects of a nutrient on sub-
jective state in the longer term may produce acute changes 
in cognition or that such changes are not related temporally. 
Hence, it is advisable to consider acute on chronic studies 
and more frequent assessments to ensure that these effects 
and the relationships between acute and chronic effects in 
both subjective and objective outcomes are captured.
Linking subjective states to mechanisms of action
Demonstration of biological plausibility is crucial when 
linking the effects of specific nutrients to subjective mood 
states; however, there is a paucity of studies which have 
attempted to link these two types of outcome within the 
same study. We will use the example of n − 3 PUFA to 
describe potential mechanisms. Animals fed a diet contain-
ing low levels of n − 3 PUFA display impaired emotional 
and cognitive behaviour [38–47]. Metabolism of monoam-
ines [48], neuronal plasticity [49], neuroinflammation [50, 
51] and stress response [52] are impaired in the brains of 
these animals. In humans, an impaired stress response has 
been repeatedly associated with low n − 3 PUFA [44, 53–
57]. Promising data obtained in humans and animal models 
show that docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) dietary supplemen-
tation lowers self-reported cognitive (e.g. feeling unease 
and fear) and physiological (e.g. sweating) anxiety symp-
toms [58], cortisol response to mental stress [55, 59] and to 
inflammatory stimuli [60], and peripheral and brain inflam-
mation, especially in healthy older adults [50, 61–65]. 
The activity of proinflammatory cytokines in the brain are 
involved in the development of somatic symptoms (fatigue, 
attention, etc.) known to alter mental performance and 
mood as described above [66–68]. To conclude, preclinical 
studies have highlighted plausible biological mechanisms 
relating to neurobiological systems involved in mood and 
cognitive disorders, possibly underlying the effects of vari-
ous nutrients on subjective mood state.
Recommendations and conclusions
In this paper, we argue that the subjective effects of foods on 
self-reported mood and cognition can enrich our understand-
ing and interpretation of gold-standard “objective outcome 
measures” (cognitive test outcomes, e.g. reaction times, 
the number of words recalled and physiological markers, 
e.g. salivary cortisol concentrations) and should be consid-
ered both concomitantly and independently. Thus, we make 
the case that measures of subjective states are a valid and 
appropriate methodology for assessing the effects of nutri-
tional intake on mood and mental performance. The pro-
posed approach extends the traditional cognitive approach 
of using standard “objective” performance measurements to 
also include consumers’ subjective experiences in relation to 
food. Our specific recommendations are as follows:
•	 Consideration of both traditional mood questionnaires or 
the use of ecological momentary assessment (EMA) or 
experience sampling methods (ESM), which may more 
realistically capture transient mood states. Identifying 
which are best and most reliable under which condition.
•	 Use measures sufficiently sensitive to detect effects of a 
nutritional manipulation and to evaluate the magnitude 
and meaningfulness of changes demonstrated, e.g. by 
comparison with effects induced by drugs or alcohol or 
variations in mood which occur over the course of a day.
•	 Consider the possibility that subjective and objective 
measures will occur within different time frames and 
in response to different doses. Acute on chronic studies 
may help capture transient effects on mood or cognitive 
function which may result in longer-term measureable 
benefits.
•	 Recognition of the importance of expectancy and pla-
cebo effects when measuring subjective mood states and 
behaviour generally and selection of well-matched pla-
cebos.
•	 Demonstrating biological plausibility is crucial when 
linking the effects of specific nutrients to subjective 
mood states and behaviour.
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